Ahmadiyya

Size

Membership is at least 10–20 million by independent estimates, as summarized in a reference work 32, and the community claims tens of millions.

Who's in charge

The Khalifatul Masih (the Khalifa, "successor of the Messiah"), Mirza Masroor Ahmad, has led the community since 2003.

Chosen by

An electoral college of senior office-bearers.

Removable by

No one; the office is held for life.

Money in one line

Members pay compulsory graded contributions: one-sixteenth of income after tax for every earning member, and more under the Wasiyyat scheme (a pledge of part of one's income and estate) 1.

Leaving in one line

Expulsion cuts a person off from the Jamaat (the organized community), which says they "will not have any connection" with it afterwards 12.

Evidence

None of the 30 techniques is sourced to a named document. The grades are Cultural 18, Taught 7 and Codified 5.

The unanswered question

If the Khalifa errs, what written procedure corrects him — and why is there none?

Disclosure scorecard

• P
  Accounts publishedPartial(UK register) 13
• N
  Leaders' payNo
• P
  Safeguarding policyPartial(published policy) 21
• P
  Police firstPartial(the published policy refers criminal concerns to police; it does not say whether that happens before any internal process) 21
• N
  Removal procedureNo
• N
  Replies on recordNo

• name: Nusrat
• when: A Tuesday in the week before Jalsa (the community's annual convention)
• where: A town in southern England

1. She is on the duty rota of Lajna, the community's women's organization, for Jalsa again: registration desk, Saturday and Sunday. She volunteered in March and has already been reminded twice. She doesn't mind the work. She loves Jalsa: the marquees, the tens of thousands, her grandmother's face when the Khalifa speaks.
2. At lunch she opens the jamaat's (the local branch's) online chanda (contribution) portal 19 and sees the figure entered against her name, estimated from her last payslip. It is a little higher than she earns now that she's part-time. She means to correct it and doesn't, because correcting it feels like asking for less.
3. Her cousin in Lahore sends a photo of the mosque door with the minaret boarded over, by police order this time, not a mob. Nobody in the family group chat says anything for twenty minutes. Then everybody sends the same prayer.
4. After work the marriage secretary's wife calls her mother again. There is a good boy in Birmingham, a doctor, from a family with a wasiyyat. Her mother says Nusrat is thinking. Nusrat is thinking about a colleague who is not Ahmadi, which is a thought she has never said out loud to anyone.
5. In the evening she watches the Friday sermon her father recorded. The Khalifa speaks about obedience and about the martyrs of 2010. She cries at the part about the martyrs, as she always does, and means it.
6. Before bed she drafts an email to the finance secretary correcting the figure, reads it back, and deletes the second sentence, the one that explains why. Then she deletes the email. She will pay the higher figure. It is easier than being the person who asked.

Nusrat is a composite drawn from documented patterns. No real person is depicted.

The unanswered question

The strongest objection, answered

• Attack: "You are adding fuel to the fire of people who kill us."
• Concede: The persecution is real, lethal, legally codified in Pakistan, and documented on this very page before anything else. No criticism here lessens it.
• Answer: Persecution from outside does not make an internal rule beyond question. A community that has spent a century demanding that no state decide its faith is the strongest possible advocate for the same freedom for its own members who leave.

• In the UK the community's charities are on the public register 13.
• The community has kept to non-violence under extreme provocation: its response to massacres has been prayer, litigation and documentation, not reprisal.
• Girls receive a strong education, and women have their own organization (Lajna Imaillah) with its own elected leadership.
• The community explicitly renounces violent jihad, and its humanitarian work (Humanity First) is open to all.

Some of that standard is already on the record. The UK association files public accounts with the Charity Commission 1324, and it publishes a safeguarding policy, issued in 2022 and revised in 2024, that refers criminal concerns to police and statutory bodies 21. Contribution rates, marriage rules and the grounds for expulsion are published in the community's own literature 11112, so a member can read the rules that bind them.

Founded in British India when Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) took the pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) from followers in 1889, claiming to be the Promised Messiah and Mahdi (the divinely guided figure many Muslims expect in the last days). After his death a caliphate (Khilafat) was established. In 1914 it split into the majority Qadian community and the smaller Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, which rejects the caliphate 20. After Partition, headquarters moved to Rabwah (now Chenab Nagar), Pakistan. After 1984 criminal laws made practice there near-impossible, the Khalifa moved to London; on 15 April 2019 headquarters moved to Islamabad, Tilford, Surrey 10.

Timeline

Moments in the room

There are two branches: the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (caliphate, Qadian lineage) and the much smaller Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, which has no caliphate and regards the founder as a reformer, not a prophet.

Size and shape

• adherents: Membership is at least 10–20 million by independent estimates, as summarized in a reference work 32, and the community claims tens of millions.
• regions: The community is present in Pakistan (largest by community estimates, but undercounted: the 2023 census recorded 162,684 Ahmadis, and many boycott a census that does not let them record themselves as Muslim 31), India (Qadian), Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the UK, Germany, Canada and the US.
• branches: There are two: the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (caliphate, Qadian lineage) and the much smaller Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, which has no caliphate and regards the founder as a reformer, not a prophet.
• trend: The community is growing in West Africa and by conversion; in Pakistan, it faces pressure and emigration.
• participation: Institutional participation is very high. Contribution, auxiliary membership and duty rosters are organized and recorded, which is itself part of the machinery.

Authority

• Authority rests with a single living Khalifa (Khalifatul Masih), elected for life by an electoral college and regarded by members as divinely guided. Obedience to the Khalifa and to the community's administrative system (Nizam-e-Jamaat) is taught as a religious duty 18. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Beneath him is a tiered administration: national amirs (national heads) appointed by the Khalifa, local jamaat presidents, departmental secretaries (finance, general affairs/discipline, marriage, education), a trained missionary corps, and auxiliary organizations by age and sex (Khuddam for young men, Ansar for older men, Lajna for women, Atfal for boys, Nasirat for girls). OFFICIAL POLICY
• The Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya (the central administrative body) and the Tahrik-e-Jadid and Waqf-e-Jadid schemes (two long-standing funds for missionary work) administer property, missions and funds. OFFICIAL POLICY

The top of the chain

Who holds what

Who can compel an answer

In the UK and other charity-law jurisdictions, the charity regulator can compel an answer from community charities, and the civil courts can on employment and property. In Pakistan, the Supreme Court upheld the law that criminalizes Ahmadi practice 5.

Where it comes from

• Money comes from graduated compulsory contributions (chanda). The general contribution (Chanda Aam) is compulsory for every earning member at one-sixteenth of income after tax (6.25%), and the community's own guide calls it "the basic and compulsory Chanda … obligatory upon every earning Ahmadi" 1. Members who join the Wasiyyat scheme pledge one-tenth to one-third of their estate at death and pay one-tenth to one-third of income instead of Chanda Aam 2. Further schemes (Tahrik-e-Jadid, Waqf-e-Jadid, Jalsa Salana, auxiliary dues) sit on top 1. A member who does not pay the obligatory chandas cannot vote in community elections or become an office-bearer; a "chanda payer" is defined as one with no more than six months of arrears, with exceptions where the center has allowed instalments or a reduced rate 1. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Children can be dedicated before birth to lifelong service under Waqf-e-Nau, launched on 3 April 1987; dedication must be made before the child is born 15. OFFICIAL POLICY
• In the UK the community operates through registered charities on the public register, including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association United Kingdom (charity no. 299081) 13. Public registration is a genuine disclosure, stronger than many traditions in this book. The older entity, no. 299081, reported nil income for FY2025; the community now also operates through a newer registered entity, no. 1208543 13. That newer entity reported income of £41.46m, all from donations and legacies, and spending of £31.65m for the year to 30 June 2025 35. REGULATORY FILING

Follow the money

Money in numbers

Chanda is a fixed share of income — 1/16 for Chanda Aam, with Wasiyyat pledges of at least 1/10 of income and estate 12 — recorded per member 19. The only public accounts are where charity law requires them.

• Spending, 2024: The charity spent £27.80m, of which £30,000 went on governance 24.
• Worldwide: No consolidated accounts are published 13.

1. Chanda as a fixed percentage of income - Origin: The rule began with the founder's call for financial sacrifice, which set the Chanda Aam and Wasiyyat rates 12. OFFICIAL POLICY - Then: A small persecuted movement with no state, no endowment and no patrons had to fund itself entirely. - Expired? The reason has partly expired. It is now a global organization with property, media and charities in dozens of countries, and the contribution rates have not been reduced. - Benefits now: The central administration and its schemes benefit. Where charities are registered (UK), disclosure exists 13; elsewhere it depends on the jurisdiction.
2. Obedience to the Nizam (the system) - Origin: Unity under the Khalifa became the defining lesson of the 1914 split 20; obedience to the Nizam is taught as a duty 18. - Then: Obedience protected the community against schism and against state persecution that sought to break it apart. - Expired? The external threat is real, but it is now also the reason internal dissent is unspeakable. - Benefits now: The office-bearer structure benefits, and for it loyalty, not audit, is the measure.
3. Marriage only within the community (for women) - Origin: The rule comes from rulings under the Khalifas, and permission remains at the Khalifa's discretion 11. OFFICIAL POLICY - Then: The rule served community survival. - Expired? The asymmetry (men may, with permission; women may not) is not a survival rule. It is a control rule. - Benefits now: Family and community authority over adult women's choices benefits.
4. Expulsion and social boycott - Origin: It began as administrative discipline for "un-Islamic" conduct or refusal to accept the community's arbitration (Qaza) decisions 12. OFFICIAL POLICY - Then: It enforced unity without any power of the state. - Expired? Where, as former members report, families are expected to stop speaking to a member who left, the sanction reaches past the institution into the kitchen. - Benefits now: The system benefits from its ability to make exit socially unaffordable.

Information

• Friday sermons by the Khalifa are broadcast worldwide on the community's own channel (MTA, since 1994) and form the shared weekly instruction 16. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Members are taught that criticism of the Khalifa or the system is spiritually dangerous. Former members report pressure against reading ex-member or opposing material. FORMER MEMBER TESTIMONY
• The external information environment in Pakistan is itself hostile: Ordinance XX criminalizes Ahmadi religious expression 3. OFFICIAL POLICY

Children

• Auxiliary membership begins at seven (Atfal for boys, Nasirat for girls), with attendance, study and contribution expectations. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Waqf-e-Nau children are dedicated by their parents before birth, follow a structured syllabus by age, and are asked to renew the pledge themselves at fifteen 1533. OFFICIAL POLICY
• In Pakistan, community elders report discrimination against Ahmadi students in educational institutions, as the UK Home Office records 31. The harm to children recorded on this page is overwhelmingly external. GOVERNMENT REPORT

Bodies

• Women have a separate organization (Lajna) with its own elected officers, but the apex, the national amirs and the missionary corps are male. OFFICIAL POLICY
• An Ahmadi woman may not marry a non-Ahmadi man; men may marry outside the community with permission, at the Khalifa's discretion 11. The rule is asymmetric. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Purdah (the practice of veiling and of separating women from unrelated men) and dress norms are enforced through the auxiliary structure rather than the state. OFFICIAL POLICY / FORMER MEMBER TESTIMONY

Thirty named techniques from domestic-abuse and social-psychology research, applied to institutions, in the eight stages of the cycle. Each carries an evidence grade for this tradition.

All thirty at a glance

Stage 1 · Idealize

Stage 2 · Hook

Stage 3 · Devalue

Stage 4 · Confuse

Stage 5 · Isolate

Stage 6 · Extract

Stage 7 · Discard

Stage 8 · Replace

What they say, what the record shows

Accountability or theatre?

• Last ran: No documented internal case was found (see loop 6).
• Chair now: The Khalifa holds it, with the national amirs he appoints.
• Predict: Any internal reform will be announced from the pulpit as guidance, not conceded as a correction.

Words used here

What leaving costs

• Formal expulsion from the administrative system cuts a member off from the Jamaat; the community's own explanation describes it as organizational removal, after which the person "will not have any connection with the Jama'at" 12. OFFICIAL POLICY Former members describe expected social distancing by other members; this rests on their testimony alone, and no community text on members' social contact with the expelled has been found. FORMER MEMBER TESTIMONY
• Leaving can cost marriage and family standing: an Ahmadi woman may not marry a non-Ahmadi man, while men may marry outside the community with the Khalifa's permission 11. OFFICIAL POLICY
• For those leaving toward mainstream Islam the social cost is internal. For Ahmadis who stay, the legal cost in Pakistan is imposed by the state. The two costs must not be confused.

The ledger of exit

How the cost is denied

Who benefits

• The central administration and the office of the Khalifa benefit; they direct the worldwide contribution system, property and media (MTA). OFFICIAL POLICY
• Salaried missionaries and office-bearers benefit, because their standing rests on the system.
• In Pakistan, politicians and clerical movements benefit from anti-Ahmadi law: it is a reliable mobilizing issue, as the 1954 Punjab inquiry found 9. GOVERNMENT REPORT

Money out, leverage back

• Persecution is real 356 and is also the most effective argument against internal criticism: to question the system is to side with the people attacking the mosques. PATTERN OBSERVED
• The Wasiyyat scheme links a member's estate and final resting place to lifelong good standing 2. OFFICIAL POLICY
• Waqf-e-Nau creates a generation whose path was assigned before birth, though they are asked to reaffirm it at fifteen 1533. OFFICIAL POLICY

Who pays

• Ahmadis in Pakistan pay: they are criminally liable for calling themselves Muslim, calling their building a mosque, or using Islamic greetings 35, and they are excluded from the general voter list unless they renounce their faith 14. OFFICIAL POLICY COURT RECORD
• Women pay, under the asymmetric marriage rule and a male apex.
• Waqf-e-Nau children pay, because their vocation was pledged before birth.
• Former members pay, under expulsion and, by their own accounts, social boycott.
• Lahore-movement Ahmadis pay, and so do those who question the caliphate from inside.

Where the weight lands

The costs in section 15 do not fall evenly. Two kinds of harm are recorded on this page: harm done to the community by states, and harm done by its own rules to the people inside it. The weight falls hardest where a person has the least power inside the institution and the fewest places to go outside it. The table names who carries the most, how, and what makes it worse.

Most of the system's work is done below the Khalifa and the national amirs, by office-bearers and missionaries who see decisions without making them. Section 15 records that the whole system is staffed by volunteer office-bearers, and each of them stands at one point where the next demand could be declined. The table sets out what each role does, what it sees, what it is asked to do and where it could refuse.

1. The 1954 Munir inquiry — Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953. It found the anti-Ahmadi agitation was politically driven, and that religious scholars could not agree on a definition of a Muslim 9. GOVERNMENT REPORT
2. Zaheeruddin v. State (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 1993) — The court upheld Ordinance XX's criminalization of Ahmadi religious practice 5. COURT RECORD
3. Lahore mosque attacks, 28 May 2010 — Coordinated attacks on two mosques killed 94 people. Human Rights Watch was still calling for prosecution of suspects in 2012 6. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
4. Cikeusik, Indonesia (6 Feb 2011) — A mob killed three Ahmadis. Twelve attackers were sentenced to three to six months, and a wounded Ahmadi was also jailed for six months 8. COURT RECORD

Internal machinery: No case was found in the public record.

It has been broken before

What would change this page

Published, audited worldwide accounts, and a written procedure for appeal against expulsion, would revise this page's findings on disclosure and exit.

• Abdus Salam. An Ahmadi physicist, he shared the 1979 Nobel Prize, Pakistan's first. The word "Muslim" was erased from "the first Muslim Nobel Laureate" on his gravestone at Rabwah under Ordinance XX 25.
• The Lahore movement. It rejected the caliphate itself in 1914, and still does 20.
• The 1954 Munir inquiry. Two judges found that the religious scholars who demanded Ahmadis be declared non-Muslim could not agree among themselves on what a Muslim is 9.
• Former members. They describe expulsion and expected boycott by family; their accounts are testimony, graded as such, and no community text on the boycott is cited.

In closing

1. No community in this book has more right to talk about the cost of the state deciding who counts as a Muslim. Yours has written that experience into law reports, inquiry records and gravestones. That is exactly why the same standard, that belief cannot be compelled, applies inside as well as out.
2. You can love the Khalifa and ask for the accounts. You can keep every Friday sermon and still refuse a boycott of your own brother. That is not weakness of faith. It is the motto on your own mosques, applied to the people who leave.

Practical guidance, not legal advice.

1. Expect social, not legal, costs outside Pakistan. Expulsion is published 12; former members report that members may be expected to stop associating with you.
2. Women face a specific cost: marriage outside the community is restricted for women, at the Khalifa's discretion 11.
3. Waqf-e-Nau pledges were made for you before birth 15; you are not legally bound by them.
4. In Pakistan, your legal status as an Ahmadi does not change with leaving, and the risk you face comes from the law and the crowd, not from the community 3.
5. Find support from organizations that know high-control communities, listed in section 25 2627.

Checked 2026-09-27.

1. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, An Introduction to Financial Sacrifice (PDF). https://files.alislam.cloud/pdf/An-Introduction-to-Financial-Sacrifice.pdf — and AhmadiPedia, "Chanda Aam." https://www.ahmadipedia.org/content/scheme/3/chanda-aam — the 1/16 rate; Chanda Aam as "the basic and compulsory Chanda."
2. Majlis Khuddam-ul-Ahmadiyya India, "Al-Wasiyyat." https://khuddam.in/al-wasiyyat/ — Wasiyyat rates on estate and income.
3. APPG on Freedom of Religion or Belief (UK Parliament), Briefing: Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws — Ahmadiyya Community, Sep 2022. https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/Blasphemy-laws-and-allegations-in-Commonwealth-Countries-Breifings-Ahmadiya-Community.pdf — Ordinance XX, ss. 298-B/C.
4. Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Politics of Exclusion: A case study of the 2nd Constitutional Amendment (2019). https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Politics-of-Exclusion-A-case-study-of-2nd-Constitutional-Amendment.pdf
5. Khan, "The Case of Zaheeruddin v. State…," Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 10(4). https://rjglb.richmond.edu/files/2013/03/rgl_10-4_khan.pdf — 1993 SCMR 1718, decided 3 Jul 1993.
6. Human Rights Watch, "Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis," 1 Jun 2010. https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis — and "Pakistan: Prosecute Ahmadi Massacre Suspects," 27 May 2012. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/27/pakistan-prosecute-ahmadi-massacre-suspects — both give 94 killed.
7. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree (Briefing 78, Jul 2008). https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/asia-pacific/indonesia/b078-indonesia-implications-ahmadiyah-decree — and HRW, "Indonesia: Reverse Ban on Ahmadiyah Sect," 10 Jun 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/10/indonesia-reverse-ban-ahmadiyah-sect
8. Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: For Ahmadiyah, the Official Line Kills," 24 Feb 2011. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/24/indonesia-ahmadiyah-official-line-kills — and Inside Indonesia, "One year after the Cikeusik tragedy." https://www.insideindonesia.org/archive/articles/one-year-after-the-cikeusik-tragedy — sentences.
9. Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (the Munir Report). Full text: https://archive.org/stream/The1954JusticeMunirCommissionReportOnTheAntiAhmadiRiotsOfPunjabIn1953/The-1954-Justice-Munir-Commission-Report-on-the-anti-Ahmadi-Riots-of-Punjab-in-1953_djvu.txt — excerpts (Columbia University): http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_munirreport_1954/
10. Ahmadiyya Press & Media Office, "Historic Moment – Islamabad in Surrey Becomes the New Headquarters…," Apr 2019. https://www.pressahmadiyya.com/press-releases/2019/04/historic-moment-islamabad-surrey-becomes-new-headquarters-centre-ahmadiyya-muslim-community/
11. Al Islam, "Can Ahmadi Muslim women marry non-Ahmadi Muslim men?" https://www.alislam.org/question/https-www-alhakam-org-answers-to-everyday-issues-part-30/ — and Al Hakam, "Why are some Ahmadis sometimes given permission to marry non-Ahmadis…?" https://www.alhakam.org/why-are-some-ahmadis-sometimes-given-permission-to-marry-non-ahmadis-or-non-muslims
12. Al Islam, "Why are some people expelled from the Jama'at?" https://www.alislam.org/book/quest-of-curious-muslim/why-are-some-people-expelled-from-jamaat/ — grounds for expulsion; "will not have any connection with the Jama'at." Community guidance limiting members' social contact with the expelled could not be confirmed.
13. Charity Commission for England and Wales, register entries: Ahmadiyya Muslim Association United Kingdom, no. 299081 https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/charity-details/?regid=299081&subid=0, and no. 1208543 https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/en/charity-search/-/charity-details/5242246/governance
14. Human Rights Watch, "Pakistan: Ensure Ahmadi Voting Rights," 29 Jun 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/pakistan-ensure-ahmadi-voting-rights — and "Pakistan Denies Voting Rights to Religious Community," 8 Dec 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/08/pakistan-denies-voting-rights-religious-community — the passport declaration; the separate electoral list.
15. Al Hakam, "Waqf-e-Nau: A new era of servants for Islam." https://www.alhakam.org/waqf-e-nau — launched 3 Apr 1987; pledge before birth.
16. MTA International, "About us." https://www.mta.tv/aboutus — established 1994.
17. Minority Rights Group, "Ahmaddiyas" (Pakistan profile). https://minorityrights.org/communities/ahmaddiyas/ — and US State Department International Religious Freedom reports (country chapters).
18. Al Islam, "Importance of Obedience to Nizam-e-Jama'at." https://www.alislam.org/articles/importance-obedience-nizam-e-jamaat/
19. Ahmadiyya Muslim Association UK Finance, https://finance.ahmadiyya.uk/ — directs members to an online chanda portal (https://chanda.org.uk/).
20. Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Ahmadiyyah." https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ahmadiyyah — the 1914 split.
21. Ahmadiyya Muslim Association UK, Safeguarding Policy (2022), https://ahmadiyya.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/AMA-UK-Safeguarding-Policy-2022.pdf, and 2024 revision, https://ahmadiyya.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/AMA-UK-Safeguarding-Policy-2024-Final.pdf
22. GlobeNewswire (community press release), "60th Ahmadiyya Muslim Convention…," 21 Jul 2026 — quotes Rafiq Hayat as National President. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/07/21/3330212/0/en/60th-Ahmadiyya-Muslim-Convention-to-Unite-50-000-in-Hampshire-for-Peace-and-a-Celebration-of-Muslim-Britishness.html
23. Al Hakam, "Conspiracies against the Jamaat: A study in historical patterns." https://www.alhakam.org/conspiracies-against-the-jamaat-a-study-in-historical-patterns/
24. Charity Commission for England and Wales, Ahmadiyya Muslim Association United Kingdom (299081), "Financial history" — income £26.21m (2021), £24.83m (2022), £26.41m (2023), £29.82m (2024). https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/en/charity-search/-/charity-details/299081/financial-history
25. Al Jazeera, "The first Pakistani Nobel laureate few have heard of" (2019) — the erased word on Abdus Salam's gravestone. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/pakistani-nobel-laureate-heard-191027174934452.html
26. Humanists UK, Faith to Faithless helpline. https://humanists.uk/faith-to-faithless/helpline/
27. Ex-Muslims of North America, "Support Communities". https://exmuslims.org/community/
28. Karma Nirvana, national Honour Based Abuse Helpline. https://karmanirvana.org.uk/get-help/helpline/
29. Humanists International, "Humanists at Risk". https://humanists.international/what-we-do/humanists-at-risk/
30. Muslim Women's Network UK, helpline (0800 999 5786, freephone; Mon–Fri 10am–4pm). https://www.mwnuk.co.uk/mwn-helpline
31. UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: Ahmadis, Pakistan, March 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pakistan-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-ahmadis-pakistan-march-2025-accessible — the 2023 census count of 162,684; the census boycott; community estimates of 400,000–600,000; complaints of discrimination against students.
32. Wikipedia, "Ahmadiyya". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmadiyya — a reference-work summary of estimates of worldwide membership ("at least 10 to 20 million"); not a primary count.
33. Ahmadiyya Muslim Association UK, Waqf-e-Nau department, "Waqf-e-Nau Reconfirmation." https://wen.ahmadiyya.uk/?p=1147 — Waqifeen-e-Nau renew their covenant at fifteen.
34. US Commission on International Religious Freedom, "USCIRF Condemns Rising Attacks on Ahmadiyya Muslims in Pakistan," 24 May 2025. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-condemns-rising-attacks-ahmadiyya-muslims-pakistan
35. Charity Commission for England and Wales, Ahmadiyya Muslim Association United Kingdom (1208543), "Financial history" — income £41.46m and spending £31.65m, year to 30 June 2025. https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/en/charity-search/-/charity-details/5242246/financial-history

• 2026-10-03: Corrected the Pakistan census wording (Ahmadis are counted, though many boycott the count). Replaced a quotation about contributions that we could not find in the cited documents with the community guide's own words. Separated the published rules on expulsion from former members' reports of a boycott. Corrected the marriage rule for women, the source for the worldwide size range and several technique grades, and added an Evidence summary. Added the May 2025 killings in Pakistan and the latest UK charity figures, and updated the Ex-Muslims of North America entry.
• 2026-09-27: Added Branches, Law & state, Money in numbers (UK accounts 2021–2024), Voices from inside, three regional cards, Leaving safely and Where to get help.